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The legislative gaps in international eCommerce and specifically in the gambling 
industry mean that many consumers face the market condition of caveat emptor (let the 
buyer beware). In terms of consumer psychology, caveat emptor increases consumer 
perceptions of risk and slows the diffusion of Internet gambling. This paper discusses 
the specific risks associated with Internet gambling and presents an industry structure 
designed to off-set consumer perceptions of perceived risk through industry self 
regulation and alternative dispute management techniques. 
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Risk and Internet Gambling 
The potential risks consumers face when making financial transactions on the 
Internet are widespread. Lansing and Hubbard (2003) note that the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission received over 10,700 complaints in 1999, and that even the most reputable 
websites (e.g. eBay, Sotheby's, Amazon) have been rocked by scandals that have affected 
consumers. More recently, a report in Marketing Matters claims the Internet Crime 
Complaint Centre received 207,449 complaints in 2004 (a 66.6% increase over 2003) and 
that the total monetary loss from fraud cases was $68.14 million (American Marketing 
Association, 2005). The National Consumers League, 2006) Internet fraud website 
reports the number of complaints they received increased from 10,794 in 2004 to 12,315 
in 2005, with lotteries/lottery clubs ranked fifth on the top scam category. 
The organic structure of the Internet gambling industry makes it difficult to estimate 
levels of complaint in the industry. Data specific to complaints with Internet gambling 
come from the self proclaimed "independent standards authority for the online gaming 
industry called E-Commerce and Online Gaming Regulation and Assurances ( e-cogra) 
which reports receiving a total of 439 complaints for 2005 and of those only 10% 
of complaints turned out to be valid complaints demanding redress. In addition, the 
Interactive Gaming Council, an industry body of Internet gambling providers which are 
licensed to operate from a jurisdiction (or defined political boundary), reports receiving 
approximately 1000 complaints since 2001 (Smith and Catania 2005). 
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Although the Internet gambling industry produces data suggesting strong growth 
from inception to predicted turnover of almost $12billion in 2005 (e.g., Christiansen 
Capital Advisors, 2006), the industry's market penetration remains low and its diffusion 
slow relative to other forms of gambling. For example, in the U. S. there are an estimated 
six million Internet gamblers (Christiansen Capital Advisors, LLC & River City 2005) 
out of a resident U.S. population aged over eighteen years of over 220 million people 
(or 2.7% market penetration). By comparison, the American Gaming Association (2005) 
cites data from Harrah's Casinos that estimate 54.1 million people over 18 years of age 
left their home to visit a casino in 2004 (25% market penetration). The American Gaming 
Association also refers to Luntz Research Companies data that 53% of the U.S. adult 
population played lotteries in 2004. From one of the few studies that examine gambling 
from inception and over time, it can be seen the diffusion of all lottery products in 
Florida was far more rapid than the growth experienced by Internet gambling (Mizerski, 
Miller, Mizerski and Lam, 2004). In Australia Roy Morgan Research (2004) indicates 
Internet gambling has been growing at approximately .1% to .2% per annum, and market 
penetration is approximately I% of people aged 18+ years. This diffusion rate compares 
poorly with other new forms of gambling introduced since the 1990s and by contrast, 
an estimated 80+% of Australians report gambling each year. The Internet's slow rate 
of diffusion and low market penetration occur regardless of the Internet's competitive 
advantages whereby consumers can choose from a vast number of gambling formats 
from the comfort of their home and (potentially) better odds due to few brick and mortar 
overheads and potential tax and compliance advantages. 
It has been suggested that U. S. citizens comprise as much as 80% of global Internet 
gambling, but that the activity is 100% illegal in the U.S. (Payne, 2005). However, these 
data and the legal status of Internet gambling are contested by some members of the 
interactive gambling industry, especially those operating with a license from a politically 
recognised nation. Still, heightened levels of consumer risk resulting from the absence 
of regulation are manifest through concerns for security, respect for privacy, customer 
service, timely delivery, full and fair disclosure and responsiveness to complaints (e.g., 
Coventry, 2000). Cabot (2001) adds that the Internet gambling operators' integrity, 
possible intentions to defraud and jurisdictional and other legal issues are factors that may 
adversely influence consumer perceptions of Internet gambling. According to the CEO of 
London based Sports bet, regulation of the Internet gambling industry "would eliminate 
some of the less-than-reputable sites" (Tedesco, 2005). 
This paper suggests that the absence of effective consumer laws governing Internet 
commerce (c.f. Johnson and Post, 1996; Donahey, 2003) heightens perceptions of risk 
to levels so high as to render the risks unacceptable to many consumers. The absence of 
high levels of regulation normally associated with gambling and the intangible nature 
of Internet gambling may exacerbate consumer perceptions of risk with the Internet 
and make consumers reluctant to trial Internet gambling. As perceived risk is a major 
behavioural determinant for consumers (Cox and Rich, 1964) and there is an inverse 
relationship between product trial and perceived risk (Dash, Schiffman and Berenson, 
1976), the absence of an effective legal framework protecting consumers increases the 
risks faced by consumers and seems a likely inhibitor for consumer transactions over the 
Internet. Indeed, heightened levels of perceived risk have been found to be an inhibitor of 
consumer transactions over the Internet (Jarvenpaa and Tractinsky, 1999; Pavlou, 2001; 
Featherman and Pavlou, 2003). 
Internet gambling occurs under conditions of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware). It 
is the seller's problem how to alleviate the risks perceived in his product (Roselius, 1971). 
Internet gambling will only fulfil its market potential when credible solutions can be found 
to the consumer issues of: to whom does one turn when something goes wrong, what laws 
apply and is it practical to seek redress? This paper presents an integrated model of industry 
self regulation that incorporates constructs of trust and service recovery, and specialised 
alternative dispute resolution procedures to neutralise actual and perceived consumer risk. 
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Moderating Consumer Perceptions of Perceived Risk with Internet Gambling 
The absence of legal frameworks that specifically permit and regulate Internet 
gambling in markets such as the U.S. and Australia represents a considerable structural 
difference compared to terrestrial gambling. In terrestrial gambling the rights of 
consumers are well defined and the operating conditions of casinos and other gambling 
providers highly regulated and readily controllable within physical structures. Firms 
that supply gambling facilities over the Internet are at a competitive disadvantage as 
Internet gambling occurs under 
conditions of caveat emptor. 
Risk 
consumers have no obvious assurances about the validity of 
licenses, the honesty of the games played and their rights if there 
is a disagreement. As reflected in Figure 1, this paper suggests 
that intentions to gamble on the Internet will improve with a 
better understanding of consumer risks and the moderating 
variables of self regulation and alternative dispute resolution. 
The literature suggests that there are several different types of risk associated 
with consumer behaviour. Cunningham (1967) considered risk had six dimensions: (1) 
performance, (2) financial, (3) opportunity/time, (4) safety, (5) social, (6) psychological 
loss, but that all risk ultimately stemmed from performance risk. Featherman and Pavlou 
(2003) later suggest the addition of (7) Privacy risk be added to the general typology of 
risk relevant to an online environment. Cunningham's proposition that all risk stemmed 
from performance risk was empirically tested in an online environment using structural 
equation modelling by Featherman and Pavlou (2003) and was strongly supported as 
the antecedent to other forms of risk. It is apparent that the absence of effective legal 
protocols and recognised avenues by which consumers can take recourse heightens the 
level of environmental (privacy and financial) and performance (including satisfaction 
with the product) risk faced by consumers. There is no clear theoretical justification that 
the Internet can meaningfully influence consumer perceptions of risk associated with 
opportunity/time, safety, social, or psychological dimensions. 
For the purposes of this paper, financial risk represents the opportunity of monetary 
losses. This is consistent with McCorkle's ( 1990) definition of financial risk as concern 
over any financial loss that might be incurred because of the product purchase. Privacy 
has previously been defined as the ability of the individual to control the terms under 
which personal information is acquired and used (Westin 1967, cited by Culnan and 
Armstrong 1999). To be more relevant for research into the Internet, this definition is 
refined to include the theft of private information or illegal disclosure. The third dimension 
of risk is performance risk. Jacoby and Kaplan (1972) suggest that concern over whether 
the product will perform as expected is perceived as performance risk. This paper 
broadly applies transaction satisfaction (often associated with services) as the measure 
of performance risk. This is appropriate as the Internet industry for which the conceptual 
model is constructed is a pure service industry (e.g., Jarvenpaa and Tractinsky 1999). 
Industry Self Regulation 
The need to create an environment of trust, predictability and certainty that features 
good arbitration and jurisdiction has been recognised as necessary fore-commerce to 
flourish (Endeshaw, 1999). Electronic commerce will not realise its full potential unless 
consumers can be sure that they can resolve their grievances in an expeditious and cost 
effective manner (Donahey, 2003). This paper suggests a framework of industry self 
regulation (consisting of accredited service recovery and trust tags) and alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) as the means to neutralise perceived consumer risk associated 
with the Internet as a marketing channel and thereby reduce sizeable barriers to purchase. 
Industry accreditation is proposed as the marque for minimum standards for firms that 
operate over the Internet, conceptually replacing a permit or license to trade that may be 
issued by government in more traditional forms of commerce. 
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Figure 1 shows trust as one of the two basic components of industry self regulation. I 
A number of studies have confirmed that low levels of trust and satisfaction exist between 
buyers and sellers on the Internet (e.g. Yoon, 2002; Culnan and 
Armstrong, 1999). Reichheld and Schefter (2000; 107) go so far 
as to claim that "price does not rule the web, trust does". Keen 
(1999) identified a lack of trust as a major reason why consumers 
do not purchase over the Internet. Hoffman, Novak and Peralta 
(1999) suggest that a lack of trust is a barrier to consumer 
transactions over the Internet and that seller opportunism and 
concerns about the misuse of Internet infrastructure are causes of 
low consumer trust In general, the higher the perception of risk, 
the higher the trust needed to facilitate a transaction (Jarvenpaa 
and Tractinsky, 1999; Koller, 1988). 
Electronic commerce will 
not realise its full potential 
unless consumers can be sure 
that they can resolve their 
grievances in an expeditious 
and cost effective manner. 
Figure 1: Consumer Risk, Self Regulation and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
This paper advocates the development of a trust tag as a component for industry 
self regulation. In this instance, a trust tag should be a binding agreement by industry 
members to maintain a minimum standard of service recovery processes, and a formal 
agreement to utilise specialist alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes should 
attempts at service recovery be deficient. While a trust tag may indicate minimum 
operating standards to consumers, the threat of withdrawal of a trust tag by an industry 
organisation becomes part of the enforcement tool-kit. The Cyberspace business 
community has strong self interests in the creation and enforcement of rules for Internet 
trade (Johnson and Post, 1996). In practice, and areas worthy of further research, 
strategies are required to deal with "rogue" sites displaying the trust tag when they are not 
members and the development of efficient marketing campaigns 
to convey the benefits of the trust tag to consumers. 
The second component of industry self regulation is service 
recovery. The short term commercial rationale of service recovery 
and defensive marketing schemes can be justified to members as 
the cost of generating new customers generally exceeds the cost 
of retaining existing customers (Fornell and Wernerfelt, 1987; 
A lack of trust is a barrier to 
consumer transactions over the 
Internet. 
Fornell and Westbrook, 1984; Brown, 2000) by as much as five times (Hart, Heskett and 
Sasser 1990; Keaveney, 1995). A customer's long term value to the firm is usually higher 
than the value of the purchase complained about (Fornell and Westbrook, 1984) and 
customer exit implies a direct loss of revenue (e.g. Fornell and Wernerfelt, 1987). In the 
general e-commerce environment, Mainspring and Bain & Company (2000, cited in Long 
and McMellon, 2004) estimate that the average consumer must shop four times at an 
online store before profits are realised from that customer. There is no publicly available 
information on the profitability of customers and the need for customer repeat purchase 
associated with Internet gambling. 
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A more strategic view of service recovery is espoused for this model. Minimum 
levels of service recovery are required to build consumer trust and reduce their 
perceptions of risk, thereby reducing barriers to product trial. Documented and minimum 
service recovery standards should be required for accreditation to the self-regulating 
industry body to reinforce the perception that Internet gambling firms and the industry are 
striving to assist consumers. 
The cornerstone of service recovery is the employment of resources designed to 
increase consumer voice. Customers give voice in the expectation of service recovery 
and to seek redress (Dasu and Rao, 1999). When viewed positively, customer complaints 
can give an organisation a chance to turn a dissatisfied consumer into a satisfied and 
loyal customer (Fornell and Wernerfelt, 1987) with even stronger brand loyalty than 
The cornerstone of service 
recovery is the employment of 
resources designed to increase 
customers who did not complain (e.g. Hart et al., 1990; Kelley 
et al., 1993). It has also been shown that effective service 
recovery can enhance consumer perceptions of satisfaction, 
purchase intent and positive word of mouth (Maxham, 2001). 
Other research has identified that satisfaction varies with 
consumer VOlCe. the level of service recovery effort and likely increases with 
excellent service recovery practices (McCollough, Hoffman and 
Berry, 1996; Kelley and Davis, 1994). For online businesses, 
additional benefits of accepting feedback can include: more knowledge of consumer (i.e., 
preferences and past behaviour), customer education, the opportunity to prevent further 
service errors, and the bases for mass customisation of products (Meuter et al., 2000). 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
The active participation of Internet gambling firms in a specialised ADR scheme 
would be a condition of membership in the peak industry organisation. The basic tenet 
of a successful ADR scheme is that it should be fair and equitable for all parties. These 
general principles include: the impartiality of any decision-makers; accessibility of the 
systems and procedures; the need to ensure that the mechanisms are at low or no cost to 
the consumer relative to the amount in dispute; transparency, including the importance of 
providing consumers with clear and conspicuous. information about the procedures and 
commitments involved sufficient to enable informed choice and decision-making; the 
timeliness of redress (Coventry, 2000). 
Just as technology has facilitated Internet gambling, there is a growing body of 
research relating to Internet based ADR. The benefits of utilizing the Internet for dispute 
resolutions, particularly for services vended online are considered to be: efficiency, 
convenience, accessibility and cost-effectiveness (Gordon, 2001). Online methods of 
ADR could offer consumers a dispute resolution mechanism to install confidence in the 
transaction of online commerce (Donahey, 2003). Further, it is argued that ADR online 
can be particularly useful in large multiparty disputes from different countries, and that 
because all cyberspace communicants are considered equal, the Internet reduces barriers 
and imbalances between large and small disputants (Gordon, 2001). 
Just as technology has facilitated 
Internet gambling, there is a 
growing body of research relating 
to Internet based ADR. 
The two dominant forms of ADR applicable for the model 
presented in this paper are mediation and arbitration. Mediation 
may be compared with arbitration whereby a third party holds 
a hearing at which time, disputants state their positions on the 
issues, call their witnesses and offer supporting evidence for their 
respective positions (Ross and Conlon, 2000). All mediation 
practices are organised around the idea that the mediator's job 
I 
is to help the parties tell their story - to help the parties talk 
(Katsh Rifkin and Gaitenby, 2000). In their study into online dispute resolutions for eBay 
transactions, Katsh et al. (2000) preferred mediation to arbitration, and a single mediator 
to a group of mediators as it would be easier to obtain the co-operation of the second 
party. By contrast, Arbitration is an adjudicatory ADR process that requires the disputing 
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parties to submit their cases to an independent third party (an arbitrator) for a decision 
(Lansing and Hubbard, 2002). An arbitrator's decision is usually binding; however rules 
that require legal enforcement are problematic over the Internet. 
Conclusions 
Already some of the components suggested in this paper are starting to be developed. 
For example, there is some strengthening of industry bodies that may facilitate moves 
to self regulation over time. An online search of "ADR" reveals a number of different 
organisations are offering online-ADR services and a number of international bodies 
are debating the effectiveness of ADR. What is required to accelerate the path to lower 
levels of consumer risk are industry specific frameworks for the integrated development, 
management and monitoring of each of the components suggested in this model at 
an industry level. Each organization within an industry (e.g. online gambling) must 
also make it a formal and priority objective to shift consumer attitudes towards online 
commerce. 
In the proposed model of industry self regulation, the substantive rules that 
constitute the core of the social system or the operational intentions of the peak industry 
organisation should be developed collectively by firms with the express purpose of 
defining acceptable conduct towards consumers and paths to enforce and reward desirable 
behavior. It suggests minimum standards will be required for the accreditation of Trust 
(tags) and Service Recovery processes on individual forms. Remedial rules should be 
prescribed by the industry group to specify the magnitude and nature of any sanction 
required should the substantial rules be breached. Both remedial and substantive rules 
are administered by a regulator or steward charged with independence and operating 
from within the industry body. The regulator or steward would be empowered to 
use a combination of formal (e.g., fines, withdrawal of trust marks, cancellation of 
membership) and informal (e.g., social instruction, education) processes to administer 
the substantive and remedial rules. The opt-in nature of industry organisations and 
the contribution firms can make in the creation of remedial and substantive rules (rule 
agreement) suggest member firms will not be opportunistic in their compliance to codes 
of conduct and treatment of customers. This implies that the peak body's policing of 
industry policies will predominantly rely on informal processes (such as communication 
and education). Informal processes are also consistent with the dependency that peak 
industry bodies ultimately have to their constituents. However, there will be the need to 
have and be seen to have "lines in the sand" across which formal rules will be stringently 
administered in order to build consumer confidence (Donahey, 2003). Under the proposed 
model, the ultimate sanctions may include the withdrawal of membership accreditation 
and Jaw suits (including breach of contract in non-compliance of the conditions of the 
ADR processes). Coventry (2000) suggests that self-regulatory codes of conduct and 
technologies can be used to gain consumer confidence in electronic commerce. 
The model outlined in this paper was guided, and to some extent limited, by the 
existing literature. There is the need for a new paradigm for Internet gambling, and this 
may in turn be useful for other industries. The next step in this research is data collection 
from e-consumers and those yet to consume through the Internet to better understand 
consumer motivations. Thereafter it will be possible to refine the suggested model to 
moderate consumer perceptions of risk specific for Internet gambling. Further research 
into self regulation and the operation of online alternative dispute resolution methods is 
also warranted. 
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